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Abstract—Electromagnetic (EM) side-channel analysis (SCA)
is a prominent tool to break mathematically-secure cryptographic
engines, especially on resource-constrained IoT devices. Presently,
to perform EM SCA on an embedded IoT device, the entire
chip is manually scanned and the MTD (Minimum Traces to
Disclosure) analysis is performed at each point on the chip to
reveal the secret key of the encryption algorithm. However, an
automated end-to-end framework for EM trace collection and
attack has been missing. This work proposes SCNIFFER: a low-
cost, automated EM leakage SNIFFing platform to perform effi-
cient end-to-end Side-Channel attacks. Using a leakage measure
such as the signal amplitude or TVLA, we propose a greedy
gradient-search heuristic that converges to one of the points of
highest EM leakage on the chip (dimension: N × N ) within
O(N) iterations, and then perform Correlational EM Analysis
(CEMA) at that point. This reduces the CEMA attack time
by ∼ N times compared to an exhaustive MTD analysis, and
> 20× compared to choosing an attack location at random.
We demonstrate SCNIFFER using a low-cost custom-built 3-
D scanner (< $300) compared to > $50, 000 commercial EM
scanners, an H-field probe, and a variety of microcontrollers
as the devices under attack. The SCNIFFER framework is
evaluated for several cryptographic algorithms (AES-128, DES,
RSA) running on both an 8-bit Atmega microcontroller and a
32-bit ARM microcontroller to find a point of high leakage and
then perform a CEMA at that point.
Index Terms—End-to-end EM SCA Attack, Low-Cost EM
Scanning, Automated Framework, SCNIFFER
I. INTRODUCTION
As the internet of things (IoT) continues to grow, security of
many edge nodes has become critical. With many of these edge
nodes being simple microcontrollers, side-channel attacks pose
a powerful threat to their security. In the world of cryptogra-
phy, side-channel attacks have long been identified as a threat
to the security of computing and communication systems
attempting to provide confidentiality and integrity of sensitive
data, since the introduction of Differential Power Analysis
in [1]. By analyzing physical side-channel information, such
as power consumption, timing, or electromagnetic emissions,
cryptographic algorithms that are mathematically secure can
be broken efficiently.
EM side-channel analysis (SCA) is a method of using
the information found in the electromagnetic emissions of a
cryptographic system to extract the secret key, compromising
the security of such a system. Such attacks have been shown
to be capable of actually extracting secret key information, as
in [2] and [3]. These EM emissions originate from the key-
dependent current consumption of physical implementations
of cryptographic algorithms, which while flowing through the
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Fig. 1: The difference in MTD between a CEMA attack at a
point of high leakage vs. at a point of low leakage for both an
8-bit XMEGA microcontroller (a, b) and a 32-bit STM32F3
microcontroller (c, d). At a location of high leakage, the
correct key separates in 250 traces for both microcontrollers,
while a low leakage location requires > 20× more traces on
the XMEGA. At a low leakage location on the STM32F3, the
key does not separate at all within 10,000 traces.
metal layers of an IC cause EM radiation as described in [4].
EM SCA attacks have successfully been used in the real world
on PCs, shown in [5] and [6], and also on Smart Cards,
in [7] [8]. One powerful and commonly used side-channel
analysis technique is correlational electromagnetic analysis
(CEMA). In CEMA, EM measurements are taken while a
cryptographic algorithm is executing on the target system
(each measurement is known as a trace), and these traces
are correlated with a leakage model, such as the Hamming
Weight or Hamming Distance of data at a particular point in an
algorithm [1], under a hypothesis of a subset of the secret key.
In a successful attack, the hypothesis that results in maximum
correlation corresponds to the secret key. By attacking the
hidden key incrementally, for example one byte at a time for
AES-128, the entire secret key can be recovered, in orders of
magnitude less time than brute force or other cryptanalysis
methods.
While EM SCA attacks generally proceed like power SCA
attacks, the EM side-channel has a lower signal to noise ratio
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2(SNR), and successful attacks require more traces in contrast
with the power attacks. It is important to distinguish between
signal and information in this context. “Signal” refers to
the magnitude/amplitude, whereas “information” refers to the
correlated side-channel leakage present in traces. Compared
to power, EM traces have low signal (SNR), but could have
a high information to noise ratio (INR), owing to the multi-
dimensional nature of the EM signals. Hence, finding the best
point of leakage (highest INR) is extremely critical to mount
an efficient EM SCA attack. This notation of SNR and INR
will be used for the rest of the manuscript.
A. Motivation
EM side-channel attacks, while powerful in that they are
non-invasive and do not require any physical changes to
the system being attacked, and benefit from multiple views,
allowing an attacker to choose the view with maximum
information leakage (INR), introduce a number of additional
challenges compared to the power SCA attacks. Firstly, as
the EM signals go through a power to EM transformation
that reduces amplitude compared to the measurement noise
floor, the SNR of these signals is reduced compared to the
power side channel, meaning considerably more traces must be
collected to perform an attack. Secondly, unlike power attacks,
EM attacks require attackers to choose the location of the
attack in the system to capture the EM traces. This choice can
have a drastic impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of
an attack. As seen in Figure 1, depending on where the EM
probe is placed on a chip, the MTD for a CEMA attack can
vary by > 20×, even for the small 9mm x 9mm Atmega and
STM microcontrollers used as the target devices for this work.
Current methods for determining the best location to perform
CEMA are based on exhaustive search, simply performing
a CEMA attack at most locations. Alternatively, it is also
possible to choose an arbitrary location, and use as many traces
as necessary to perform the CEMA. Practically, if the size of
the system is bigger, finding the correct location of the EM
leakage becomes extremely challenging and requires scanning
the entire chip/system.
Given the limitations of present attack systems, in this work,
we propose a low-cost, fully automated, end-to-end platform
for performing efficient EM side-channel attacks. The core
of this framework is a ∼ $200 3-D printer, which we have
modified to utilize as a low-cost EM scanner. SCNIFFER
also uses a greedy gradient-search heuristic using a leakage
measure, such as signal amplitude, test vector leakage as-
sessment (TVLA), or a combination of both to quickly and
automatically locate the point of maximum leakage. Finally,
once the point is determined, the proposed SCNIFFER frame-
work performs the correlational or differential EM analysis
(CEMA/DEMA) at this point. Such an automated low-cost
attack platform significantly increases the threat surface for
IoT devices.
B. Contribution
Specific contributions of this article are:
• Firstly, a fully-automated system for efficiently scanning
a cryptographic chip and finding the location of maximum
leakage to mount an end-to-end EM SCA attack is
proposed. The entire attack set-up is extremely low-cost,
owing to the custom-built EM scanner (hacking a ∼ $200
3-D printer) used for mounting the attack, compared to
the commercially available EM probe stations, which are
very costly (> $50, 000). The system achieves 100µm
spatial resolution, has a scan range of 220mm × 220mm,
and is easily replicable. (Section 3)
• Secondly, a greedy gradient-descent heuristic is proposed
which converges to the point of highest leakage on an
N × N chip within O(N) iterations. This algorithm is
evaluated with both signal amplitude (emulating an expert
attacker performing a manual attack) and TVLA as the
measures of leakage. (Sections 4, 5)
• Finally, the SCNIFFER attack is demonstrated on two
different microcontroller architectures (8-bit XMEGA
and 32-bit STM32F3), improving the number of traces
required by ∼ 100× compared to the traditional exhaus-
tive search based attack. (Sections 5, 6)
C. Paper Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 provides the background and summarizes the existing works
on EM Scanning and side-channel attacks. In Section 3,
the SCNIFFER framework is introduced and the low cost,
custom-built EM scanning platform is presented. Section 4
describes two options for measuring leakage, signal amplitude
and TVLA, and provides motivation for finding the point of
highest leakage. In Section 5, the gradient-descent algorithm
for efficiently determining the point of maximum information
leakage is proposed. Next, Section 6 provides results of run-
ning the system on microcontrollers of varying architectures,
cryptographic algorithms executed, and measures of leakage.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
IoT devices have been successfully attacked using side
channel attacks, for example CPA was used to extract en-
cryption keys from Philips Hue smart lamps in [9]. EM side-
channel attacks originated in [10], and share many properties
with power side-channel attacks, however, can be performed
at a distance, even up to one meter, as in [11]. One of
the most powerful EM SCA attacks is CEMA, which is
the straightforward application of Correlation Power analysis
(CPA) [12] on EM traces.
Another distinction made between side-channel attacks is
whether an attack is “profiled” or “non-profiled”. In a profiled
attack, the attacker uses an identical device to the device
to be attacked, and creates a “profile” so that the attack
on the target device can be more efficient. Profiled attacks
require an identical device to be completely controllable by
the attacker, and also generally make the assumption that the
behavior of side-channels remain unchanged when moving
from one device to another. Two main varieties of profiled
attacks are Template Attacks, introduced in [13], and more
3Scanner Amplifier Probe
Picture
Cost $200 $50 $10
SCNIFFER
Specifications
100 µm 20dB 16mm2
Riscure EM Probe
Station 
Specifications
2.5 µm - 1mm2
TABLE I: Summary of the main components of the
SCNIFFER system, their costs, performance, and a compari-
son to Riscure’s EM Probe Station.
recently Machine Learning attacks, such as the SVM based
attack discussed in [14] and [15] and the Neural Network
based attack in [16] and [17]. Non-profiled attacks on the other
hand do not require attackers to have unrestricted access to an
identical device [12] [2]. However, to make these profiled and
non-profiled EM SCA attacks more practical and real-time on
any embedded platform/device, the trace capture and the attack
needs to be automated and more efficient.
SCNIFFER can use several methods of assessing leak-
age, either simple signal magnitude, or Test Vector Leakage
Assessment (TVLA) [18]. In TVLA, two sets of traces are
collected. In one set, both the key and plaintext used as input
to the algorithm under test are kept fixed, and in the other the
plaintext is varied randomly, while the key remains fixed. To
assess the leakage, one then performs Welch’s t-test for each
time point of the trace. If the maximum t-value across all time
points is below 4.5, one can conclude leakage is not present.
Addressing the issue of finding where a chip leaks the
most EM radiation has been investigated in [19], and [20].
EM scanning with a focus on side-channel attacks, that is,
determining where the most cryptographic information leaks
within a chip has been addressed in [21] and [22]. However,
such methods focus on observing the leakage over the entire
chip, not efficiently finding the point or region of the maximum
leakage. This causes these methods to take a long time and a
majority of the time is spent collecting data that is unnecessary
for an attacker. By creating a framework that minimizes this
unnecessary data collection, EM side-channel attacks can be
made more efficient, powerful, and practical, requiring far
fewer traces to reveal the secret key of the cryptographic
algorithm. Additionally, these platforms can be orders of
magnitude more costly than the system proposed in this work,
for instance the Riscure EM Probe station [23] itself can cost
∼ $50, 000, while the entire SCNIFFER system costs < $500.
SCNIFFER is the first fully-automated, efficient EM SCA
attack framework and the system is described in the following
section.
III. SCNIFFER: LOW COST AUTOMATED EM SCANNING
The SCNIFFER system is designed for low cost and au-
tomation. In this section, we first describe the physical com-
3-D Scanner 
PC
Microcontroller 
under attack
H-field Probe
Chipwhisperer
Capture Board
Microcontroller 
under attack
H-field Probe
Chipwhisperer
Capture Board
a)
b)
SCNIFFER Platform
Fig. 2: (a) The complete EM Scanning and trace capture set-up
system, including the 3-D printer, Chipwhisperer system, EM
probe, amplifier, and victim. (b) Close-up of scanner, showing
probe and victim board.
ponents that make up SCNIFFER, then discuss the automation
aspect of the system.
A. Low Cost EM Scanning Setup
The scanning hardware consists of an Ender 3 3-D
printer [24] with an H-field probe attached to the extruder, the
Chipwhisperer [25] platform for interfacing with the victim
and trace collection, an amplifier to amplify the EM probe
output, and finally a PC to control both the 3-D printer and
Chipwhisperer platform. While such EM scanning systems
do exist, for instance, Riscure’s EM Scanning Station, we
chose to create such a system from scratch for the following
reasons: 1) Commercial scanning systems (like Riscure [23])
scanning station is orders of magnitude more expensive and 2)
It is very straightforward to interface with the custom system
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AES128: Signal  Amplitude Heatmapa)
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Fig. 3: (a) Heatmap of the amplitude values obtained by per-
forming a full 30×30 scan of the 8-bit target microcontroller.
(b) This shows the grid divisions where leakage measurements
were performed. 10 traces were used to average the amplitude
values at each point. The part of the target microcontroller
board which leak the most information can be observed.
to develop the scanning algorithm. To manipulate the probe,
an Ender-3 3-D printer, running stock firmware was used.
This model of printer has a minimum step size of 0.1mm,
and can be controlled via a USB serial connection. It has a
maximum movement speed of 180 mm/s, with a print area of
220mm×220mm×250mm. The precision and speed offered
by this 3-D printer are sufficient to complete a 50×50 scan of
the 9mm×9mm IC used in testing in an acceptable time. The
system is capable of performing a 30× 30 scan of the chip in
∼ 15 minutes, and perform an amplitude scan in∼ 75 minutes.
The probe used is a commercial H-field probe for performing
EMC measurements, and the signal is amplified before being
passed to the Chipwhisperer capture board. While the probe
used does not have extremely high spatial resolution, the probe
resolution matches the scan resolution, allowing amplitude
heatmaps such as the one in Figure 3(a) to be created, and
Chipwhisperer is able to capture enough information leakage
for the target devices considered, leading to low MTDs when
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3-D AES Amplitude Surface Plot
Distribution of Amplitude at a Point of High Leakage 
Fig. 4: (a) Amplitude surface plot of the same scan as
Figure 3(a), but not averaged. Here it can be clearly seen
that the surface is not smooth or monotonic, as there are
many local minima and maxima. (b) Histogram of amplitude
measurements at a single point. 200 amplitude measurements
were made at 1 point. This distribution can explain some of
the roughness of the surface seen in (a).
probed at appropriate locations, as seen in figure 1, while still
being low cost. The complete system is shown in Figure 2(a)
showing the 3-D printer, the probe, Chipwhisperer system, and
PC. The probe and victim IC are shown in detail in Figure 2(b).
Note that during an attack, the victim board is positioned such
that the chip is parallel (horizontal) to the probe. The probe
position can be controlled manually, through the 3-D printer
controls, or programmatically through the serial connection to
a PC, as it is in the SCNIFFER system.
The major cost savings in the SCNIFFER system come
from using a low cost 3-D printer to control the probe, instead
of a high cost motorized table. The total cost of the 3-D printer,
probe and amplifier used in SCNIFFER is ∼ $500, which is a
few orders of magnitude less expensive than many motorized
tables by themselves, and nearly two orders of magnitude less
expensive than systems such as Riscure’s EM probe station
(∼ $50, 000). While more expensive scanners, probes and
measurement systems could improve spatial and frequency
resolution, such a system would only be available to very
sophisticated attackers. As SCNIFFER aims to demonstrate
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30x30 AES Amplitude Heatmap Averaged
Fig. 5: Amplitude surface plot, averaged over 10 traces. The
many local minima and maxima seen in Figure 4(a) are no
longer present, making a gradient search more effective.
practical, low-cost attacks are possible using systems two
orders of magnitude cheaper than existing scanners, high-cost,
high resolution components are not used. Table I summarizes
these components, including their costs and performance to
the Riscure system.
B. Automated EM Scanning
Now that the SCNIFFER system’s low cost hardware has
been described, we move to the automated scanning and attack
procedure. The basic premise of the automated system is
to locate a point on the target device that maximizes some
leakage measure by using the scanning algorithm specified in
Section 5, then automatically perform CEMA at this point.
This removes the need for an expert to manually analyze
example traces to choose a location for an attack.
During an attack, the probe is positioned at a location
dictated by the intelligent scanning algorithm, then, the ap-
propriate ADC phase for trace collection is determined by
capturing traces at varying ADC phases, and the phase giving
the largest average peak-to-peak amplitude is chosen for
further measurements at that particular point. Chipwhisperer is
then used to capture traces for leakage measurement (through
signal amplitude or other measures) and finally CEMA is
performed at the highest location of leakage as determined
by the algorithm. Example leakage measures tested with
SCNIFFER, and the development of the intelligent scanning
algorithm, along with detailed results are described in the
following sections.
IV. SIGNAL LEAKAGE MEASUREMENT USING SCNIFFER
As the choice of probe location is a major factor in
determining the number of traces needed to recover a key
in CEMA as shown in Figure 1, this location must be chosen
intelligently. Currently, this is done by either exhaustive search
of the entire chip, or by an expert evaluating sample EM traces
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3-D AES TVLA Surface Plot
Distribution of t-values at a Point of High Leakage 
Fig. 6: (a) TVLA Surface plot. Again, the surface is not smooth
or monotonic, as there are many local minima and maxima,
even more than in Figure 4(a). (b) Histogram of TVLA
measurements at a single point. 50 TVLA measurements were
made at a point of high leakage, each done as in (a), using 400
traces each. Given the distribution much wider seen in (b), the
increased roughness of the surface in (a) can be explained.
at several locations, and choosing a location based on visual
inspection. While an exhaustive search will certainly produce
the best location to attack, it requires a large amount of time,
especially for systems with a large initial MTD. Choosing a
location based on visual inspection may result in a location that
can be attacked, however not necessarily the best in terms of
MTD. Additionally, this method requires an expert to perform
the inspection of traces. In this work, we aim to fully automate
the process of choosing a location as an expert might, by
looking at measures of leakage, and finding the location with
maximum leakage. As with a manual choice, this location may
not be the location corresponding to the lowest MTD, but
should leak enough information to be attacked in a reasonable
amount of time.
SCNIFFER is designed such that any measure of leakage
can be used. For example signal amplitude, Test Vector Leak-
age Assessment (TVLA) [18], or a combination of both could
be used, and the SCNIFFER platform will be able to converge
to the location maximizing that measure in O(N) measure-
6MTD – TVLA – Amplitude Comparison
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MTDc)
Signal AmplitudeTVLAa) b)
Fig. 7: 10 × 10 heatmap of (a) TVLA values (b) signal
amplitudes and (c) MTDs. From these plots TVLA appears
to correlate to MTD much better than the signal amplitude.
While amplitude is often used in practice to determine the
location to attack, it is clear that high amplitude of leakage
does not necessarily correspond to high information leakage.
ments. We provide results using both signal amplitude and
TVLA, both described, and then compared in the following
subsections.
A. Signal Amplitude for Leakage Measurement
As the amplitude is being used as a proxy for leakage, it
must be measured in a repeatable way, so given a trace, the
overall amplitude of the trace is calculated as the difference
between the means of the five highest values and five lowest
values in the trace. Using this method, the surface appears as
in Figure 4(a), and is very rough. To explain this roughness,
the amplitude measurement was performed many times at
a single location resulting in the distribution of amplitude
values found in Figure 4(b). From this distribution, the local
minima and maxima of the surface can be explained. To create
more repeatable results and a smooth surface for the gradient
search algorithm described in the next section, we average 10
amplitude measurements at each location to create the final
amplitude value. This method resulted in the surface shown in
Figure 5, and is used throughout Section 5 to demonstrate the
SCNIFFER search algorithm.
B. TVLA for Leakage Measurement
One alternative to using the amplitude to measure leakage is
TVLA. While high t-values from TVLA may not necessarily
imply a low MTD, it allows locations that cannot be attacked
to be avoided. The TVLA performed is the non-specific, fixed
versus random t-test. We choose N = 200 for the number
of traces in each group, for a total of 400 traces per TVLA
performed. This number of traces creates large separation
between points of low leakage and ones of high leakage, as
seen in Figure 6(a), where the high leakage location reaches
a t-value of 22, while the low leakage location only reaches
a t-value of 4. Note that the TVLA surface is rough, like
the non-averaged amplitude surface in Figure 4(a). As with
the amplitude measurements, even at a fixed location there is
variance in the TVLA measurements, shown in Figure 6(b).
Unlike with amplitude however, it is infeasible to perform
many TVLA measurements at each point to average out this
noise.
C. Correlation among Amplitude, TVLA, MTD
While both the signal amplitude and TVLA can be used
with SCNIFFER as measures for leakage, since the end goal of
the SCNIFFER system is to perform an attack, we investigate
how these measures compare to the MTD at each location.
To compare the measures, a 10 × 10 scan of the chip was
performed, and CEMA performed using 5,000 traces at each
point. The resulting heatmap, along with heatmaps for both
TVLA and amplitude, are shown in Figure 7. From these
results, clearly TVLA appears to correlate to the MTD more
strongly than the amplitude. While signal amplitude is often
used in practice to manually determine locations to attack,
there is no guarantee that this measure correlates to the
MTD, as high signal leakage does not imply high information
leakage. Additionally, an uncorrelated EM source having high
signal leakage could confuse an attacker into choosing a poor
location to attack. While TVLA also does not guarantee high
leakage, it can be used to identify and avoid areas where
attacks are not possible. Additionally, for the microcontroller
considered in this work, TVLA does empirically correlate to
the MTD quite well, even if it is not guaranteed to be the case
in general.
V. GREEDY GRADIENT-SEARCH HEURISTIC
A critical piece of the SCNIFFER system is the algorithm
for locating the point leakage maximizing the leakage mea-
sure. It is through this algorithm that the SCNIFFER attack
framework gains benefits over an exhaustive search, as the best
location in an N×N grid can be found with N measurements
as opposed to N2. As an example, we use simple ampli-
tude measurements to demonstrate the performance of the
SCNIFFER greedy gradient-search algorithm throughout this
section. The remainder of this section describes the algorithm
in detail, and provides results of running the algorithm on an
Atmel XMEGA 8-bit processor running software AES.
A. Algorithm Description
To avoid taking measurements at all possible points, we
propose a heuristic search algorithm for finding the point of
maximum leakage in a minimum number of scans. The search
algorithm works in two phases. In the first phase, the search
space is divided into an N × N grid, and the leakage is
measured at the center of each grid cell. Then in the second
7N = Grid Resolution;
maxLeakage = 0;
initLocs = getInitialLocations(initialGridSize, N);
for loc ∈ initLocs do
moveProbe(loc);
leakage = getLeakage();
if leakage > maxLeakage then
maxLeakage = leakage;
startLoc = loc;
end
end
moveProbe(startLoc);
bestLoc = startLoc;
m = startLoc;
while Not Converged do
delta = getDelta(get4Neighbors());
m = m−stepSize∗delta;
moveProbe(m);
leakage = getLeakage();
if leakage > maxLeakage then
maxLeakage = leakage;
bestLoc = loc;
end
end
Algorithm 1: Gradient Search Heuristic to find the best
leakage location
phase, a gradient search algorithm is started from the point
of the highest leakage found in the first phase. The gradient
is estimated by taking leakage measurements in 4 points
surrounding the current location, and calculating the direction
of greatest ascent, and moving a distance of stepSize in that
direction. Note that it is possible to use different measures of
leakage for the two phases, for example the initial points are
scanned using TVLA, then the gradient search is based on
amplitude. The algorithm will stop if it attempts to measure
outside the search space, instead moving only to the edge. A
maximum number of iterations can also be specified, along
with an “iterations without improvement” stopping criteria.
This two phase process is described in Algorithm 1.
B. Performance
Based on experimental results, the algorithm is able to locate
the point of maximum leakage in a N × N grid of possible
measurements in ≈ N amplitude measurements. Figure 8
demonstrates that as the search grid size increases by N2, the
number of tests required only increases by N , showing the
improvement over an exhaustive search is more drastic as the
size of the scan increases, either due to increased resolution or
larger scan area. We also see the effect of the parameters of the
algorithm, and see how varying them affects performance. In
Figure 9(a), where, by increasing the resolution of the initial
search grid, the highest amplitude found for a given number
of measurements changes. As expected, as more initial points
are scanned, fewer gradient steps are required to converge to
the point of maximum leakage. In Figure 9(b), the step size
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Fig. 8: Leakage vs. number of amplitude measurements for
varying grid scales. The data for the 30×30 grid was the same
as in Figures 3 and 4. The full 60×60 and 10×10 grids were
also collected, allowing the performance of the algorithm to be
seen at various degrees of measurement resolution. Through
these results, it can be seen that even as the size of the search
space increases by N2, the time to find the maximum leakage
point increases by only N .
is varied, and we see that for a small step size, the algorithm
does converge to the point of maximum leakage, but slowly.
A larger step size finds the maximum also, and in slightly
fewer steps. If the step size is too large however, the algorithm
will not converge to the maximum, as it will continuously
step over the best point. Note that the effective step size is a
function of both the resolution of the scan, N , and the step size
parameter of the algorithm. This, along with the dimensions,
L, of the chip allow calculating the effective step size as
1
N ∗L mm∗StepSize. Given these results, one can see that for
reasonable choices of parameters, the algorithm is observed to
converge to the point of highest leakage in O(N) steps for an
N × N grid of measurements, providing SCNIFFER with a
significant improvement over an exhaustive search.
VI. RESULTS
In this section, we provide results of using the SCNIFFER
framework in various scenarios. We start with the results of an
attack using only the signal amplitude measure (Case 1), only
TVLA (Case 2), and a combination TVLA for initial search
with signal amplitude for gradient search and vice versa (Cases
3 and 4, respectively). Following this, we provide a short
discussion of the number of traces needed in a SCNIFFER
attack. We then show the performance of cases 1 and 2 for a
variety of cryptographic algorithms. Finally, results comparing
the 8-bit architecture chip used so far to a 32-bit architecture
chip are shown, again for both amplitude and TVLA measures.
A. Amplitude Based SCNIFFER
Initially, we look at the results of using the signal amplitude
measure for both the initial gird search and the gradient search
phases of the search algorithm. Figure 10(a) shows the path
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Fig. 9: (a) Leakage vs number of amplitude measurements
performed for varying the initial sample grid size parameter.
Note that the 2 × 2 and 3 × 3 grids locate the point of
maximum leakage within 20 measurements, while a single
point start only reaches a lower amplitude, and after 30 such
measurements. For all initial sample grid sizes, a step size of
0.84mm was used. (b) This demonstrates the effect of step
size on performance. A step size too small slows convergence
unnecessarily, and in this case as the step size increased,
convergence sped up, however, for much larger step sizes, it is
possible to overshoot the location of highest leakage, resulting
in non-convergence. For all step sizes, a 2 × 2 initial sample
grid was used.
taken by the SCNIFFER search algorithm, using amplitude for
both choosing the initial point and for gradient search (Case 1)
to find the location of highest EM amplitude, with the dotted
line showing the path taken to scan the initial points, and the
solid line showing the path taken by the gradient algorithm.
Figure 11(a) shows the separation of the correct key from a
CEMA performed at this location. While this result is not
ideal, as it requires > 5× more traces than the best location
(seen in Figure 1(a)) it can be attacked. However, looking
back at Figure 7, amplitude does not correlate with MTD, as
high signal leakage does not imply high information leakage.
Indeed, the location this case converges to is on the edge
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Fig. 10: Heatmaps for AES running on the 8-bit microcon-
troller, with the path taken to the location of highest amplitude
by SCNIFFER shown for case 1 in (a), and cases 2 and 3 in
(b). The same search algorithm parameters were used in all
cases, and the steps to converge is listed by the path taken.
between an area of high leakage and one of very low leakage.
This shows that using only amplitude to locate information
leakage is not robust. However, amplitude based search is very
fast, as only 10 traces at each point are needed to measure
amplitude.
B. TVLA Based SCNIFFER
As an alternative to signal amplitude, TVLA can be used
for both stages of the SCNIFFER algorithm (Case 2). The
path taken for this case is shown in Figure 10(b). This 5 step
path remains in the zone of high TVLA values, and as TVLA
correlates well with MTD, this location has a very low MTD,
seen in Figure 11(b), and is among the lowest on the chip.
Unlike case 1, this location is not close to any zones of low
information leakage, making the TVLA only method much
more robust than the amplitude case. This robustness comes
at the cost of needing many more traces, as each location
requires a total of 400 traces to compute TVLA. Additionally,
as the TVLA surface is less smooth, the number of steps to
converge is generally higher than amplitude, further increasing
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Fig. 11: MTD plots at locations found by SCNIFFER in cases
1(a), 2(b), 3(c), and 4(d). While the MTD is not the minimum,
it is much better than the worst locations for cases 1, 2, and
3. For case 4, the key cannot be recovered in 5000 traces.
the attack time.
C. Amplitude + TVLA Based SCNIFFER
In order to trade off time for robustness, the amplitude
based measure and TVLA can be combined. Two methods
for combining the measures are using one measure for the
initial grid search and the other for the gradient search. The
results of these combinations, along with cases 1 and 2 are
given in Table II. From this table, the combination which uses
TVLA for the initial search and amplitude for gradient search
gives the best trade-off of time for robustness, converging to a
point that remains well within the area of high leakage, while
using only slightly more traces than the amplitude only case
1. Figure 11(c) shows the key separation for this location. The
opposite case 4 however, performs very poorly, as it begins at
a point of low TVLA leakage, and is not able to escape that
region, leading to a large number of traces used in search and
an MTD > 5000, as seen in Figure 11(d). Lastly, at the SNR
levels of the system attacked in this work, case 3 gives the
best robustness-time trade-off of the 4 cases, however, as the
SNR decreases eventually the TVLA only attack will require
fewer total traces, as the number of traces is dominated by the
CEMA attack, not the search, as seen in Figure 12.
D. Number of Traces Needed For SCNIFFER Attacks
The performance of the SCNIFFER platform can be quan-
tified and compared to other methods by investigating how the
total number of traces needed to perform an attack changes
as the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the device under attack
changes. Previous works have shown in [26] and [27] that the
MTD for a CEMA attack is related to the SNR of the signal
used in the attack by MTD = k0 ∗ 1SNR2 . Additionally, [28]
have shown that the number of traces NTV LA needed to per-
form a TVLA is also related to SNR by NTV LA = c0 ∗ 1SNR .
Case InitialSearch
Gradient
Search
Convergence
Location MTD
Total
Traces
1 Amplitude Amplitude (7, 1) 1713* 1793
2 TVLA TVLA (2, 2) 223 5847
3 TVLA Amplitude (4, 2) 358 2488
4 Amplitude TVLA (8, 2) >5000 >14,640
TABLE II: Comparison of different combinations of TVLA
and amplitude used with SCNIFFER. The total traces includes
the traces needed for the initial search, gradient search, and
CEMA.
*Amplitude based search provides faster convergence, but
gives no guarantees that the location found is not a location
without information leakage as TVLA does.
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Fig. 12: Number of traces required for SCNIFFER compared
to exhaustive search vs. SNR for the case of a 10×10 scan. The
∼ 100× reduction is due to the fact that an exhaustive search
must perform a CEMA at each location, while SCNIFFER
only visits N locations, and the number of traces needed to
determine amplitudes is independent of the SNR.
From there, it is straightforward to quantify the performance
of an exhaustive search and SCNIFFER using both amplitude
and TVLA as follows,
NSCN−amp = (10 ∗N) + k0 ∗ 1
SNR2
(1)
NSCN−tvla = N ∗ c0 ∗ 1
SNR
+ k1 ∗ 1
SNR2
(2)
Nexh = N
2 ∗ k1 ∗ 1
SNR2
(3)
where N ×N is the resolution of the grid scan.
A SCNIFFER attack requires measurements to be made at
approximately N points for an N × N grid, as the search
algorithm requires O(N) measurements, with each requiring
10 traces to be averaged together in the amplitude case, and
NTV LA in the TVLA case. Additionally a single CEMA attack
requiring MTD traces is needed, resulting in equations (1) and
(2). An exhaustive search on the other hand would require
a CEMA to be performed at all N2 locations, resulting in
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equation (3). These trends are pictured in Figure 12, which
clearly shows the 100× reduction in required traces for the
case of a 10 × 10 scan once a certain SNR is reached. This
reduction can be explained by the fact that the number of
traces needed to measure TVLA changes as 1SNR , compared
to the MTD which changes as 1SNR2 . Additionally, the number
of points traversed is only N , as opposed to N2 for an
exhaustive search. Also, we see that amplitude measurements
only outperform TVLA as a leakage measure for high SNR
regions, as MTD dominates in regions of low SNR.
E. Effect of Cryptographic Algorithm on Convergence
Next, in Figure 13(a), the effect of different cryptographic
algorithms running on the target microcontroller can be seen,
when using the amplitude measure. For AES, DES, and
RSA, the gradient search algorithm converges to the point of
maximum amplitude in a similar number of traces. A 30× 30
scan was performed for all algorithms, and the parameters
were fixed at a 2 × 2 starting grid and step size of 0.54 mm
for all cases. A similar plot, using the same parameters but
TVLA as opposed to amplitude can be seen in Figure 13(b).
Again, the search converges in approximately the same number
of measurements for all algorithms. Through this, we see that
the greedy gradient search algorithm performs well regardless
of the specific cryptographic algorithm, and regardless of the
leakage measure chosen.
F. Effect of Architecture on Convergence
Lastly, we investigate the effect of different architectures
(microcontrollers) on SCNIFFER. Up to now, the results
shown have been obtained with an 8-bit XMEGA microcon-
troller. We now use a 32-bit STM32F3 microcontroller running
software AES as the target device. Given the same param-
eters for the greedy gradient search, the maximum leakage
location is found within N measurements, with N = 30
in this case. These results are shown in Figure 14(a) for
the amplitude measure, and Figure 14(b) for TVLA. In both
figures, the 8-bit and 32-bit architectures are compared, given
the same measurement and search algorithm parameters. For
all combinations, while the value of the maximum changes
between the architectures and measures, the search algorithm
finds the location maximizing the leakage measure in O(N)
measurements. Note that for amplitude measurements, one of
the initial points happened to be almost exactly the location
of the maximum, appearing to not find a maximum, when in
reality it is found in a single step. The case of using TVLA
with the 32-bit microcontroller was particularly motivating,
as only a small portion of the chip leaked any information,
however SCNIFFER was still able to converge to the location
of highest leakage in the expected number of measurements.
In this context, it is worth mentioning that as the size of the
chip under attack increases, finding the location of the cryp-
tographic engine could be a difficult task. In such scenarios
like attacking large systems, this SCNIFFER framework could
be extremely useful in efficiently determining the position of
maximum leakage and then performing the attack at the best
point of leakage.
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Fig. 13: (a) Maximum signal amplitude vs. number of mea-
surements made by the greedy gradient descent algorithm for
AES, DES, and RSA. The algorithm finds the location of
highest leakage in almost the same number of amplitude mea-
surements in all cases. For all the cryptographic algorithms,
a step size of 0.54 mm was used, and the initial sample grid
was set to 2 × 2. (b) Max t-value vs. number of TVLA tests
performed for all cryptographic algorithms (AES, DES, RSA),
showing the scanning algorithm performs well, finding the
point of max leakage within 40 TVLA tests in all cases. The
initial sampling grid was 2×2 and the step size was 0.84mm.
Note that for RSA, one of the initial samples is already close
to the maximum, and this maximum is found in just one step.
For AES and DES, whose leakage patterns are less smooth,
and have smaller areas of high leakage, the time to find the
maximum is higher.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This work has introduced SCNIFFER, a fully automated
integrated system for conducting end-to-end EM side-channel
attacks against cryptographic systems. SCNIFFER combines
an EM leakage scanning platform, and correlation EM analysis
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Fig. 14: (a) Max amplitude vs. number of measurements
for both the 8-bit XMEGA microcontroller and the 32-bit
STM32F3 microcontroller. The algorithm converges to the
point of highest leakage within O(N) measurements, where
N = 30 in both cases. the algorithm parameters used are
the same as in Figure 13. (b) Max t-value vs. number of
measurements for both microcontroller architectures, again
showing convergence in O(N) measurements. The parameters
used are the same as those in part (a).
into a single system, which can perform all steps of an
attack automatically. The system is comprised of a low-
cost custom scanning hardware and gradient search heuristic
based scanning algorithm. We also plan to make our code
for implementing the efficient SCNIFFER framework and
controlling the low-cost 3-D printer for scanning publicly
available.
SCNIFFER is capable of using a variety of measures of
leakage, and the search algorithm was shown to find the
location of maximum leakage in an N ×N chip search space
with O(N) measurements, providing a significant improve-
ment over exhaustive search, and performing all stages of the
search and attack completely automatically, removing the need
for expert analysis.
Using this fully automated attack, it is possible to efficiently
find the point of highest leakage and launch a CEMA attack
at this location at the press of a button. The attack uses a
minimal number of traces, for a variety of microcontroller
architectures and cryptographic algorithms. Even as the size
of the chip increases, or as protections increasing the MTD
are put in place, SCNIFFER retains efficiency. Finally, we
show that as the SNR of the system under attack decreases,
SCNIFFER attacks maintain their advantage over existing
methods, reducing the number of traces needed by a factor
of N compared to an exhaustive search, for an N × N scan
of a chip.
A demonstration of SCNIFFER operating in TVLA only
mode can be found here.
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